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Abstract 
Title: Snapy: A Crispy bite on Grocery Retail 
Author: Francisca Catarino 
 
Under the guidance of its founder, Artur Catarino, Progelcone started its activity in 
1983 as a pioneer producer of ice cream cones in Portugal.  
Limited by the high seasonality that characterized the ice cream industry, Progelcone 
broaden its scope and became the leader supplier of ice cream related products and plastic 
items for the food-service industry.  
In 2013, the company was already recovering from the European debt crisis, which 
had decreased its clients financial capacity and contributed to the excess capacity of the 
company. Despite having reached sales of €12,6 million in the HORECA channel in 2013, 
Progelcone was confronted with a major challenge in 2014. Adding to the strong impact of 
seasonality, Progelcone had just lost its biggest client, Olá, a local brand of Unilever’s ice 
cream business. The company believed that launching Snapy, a wafer cookie, in Jumbo 
supermarket, had the potential to increase revenues and contribute to the firm’s growth. 
However, a category dominated by private labels and competitors such as Mondelez, and the 
lack of knowledge of branding nuances may impose significant challanges. 
The strategies followed by Progelcone are an interesting subject of discussion. The 
Case Study can be used within strategic management and marketing courses, and includes 
topics of diversification, brand positioning, the empowerment of private labels and retailers’ 
bargaining power. This thesis includes a literature review, plus a teaching note that focused 
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Sob a orientação do seu fundador, Artur Catarino, a Progelcone iniciou a sua 
atividade em 1983 como pioneira na produção de cones para gelado em Portugal. 
 Limitada pela sazonalidade que caracterizava a indústria do gelado, a Progelcone 
alargou o seu escopo e tornou-se a principal fornecedora de produtos relacionados a gelados e 
embalagens de plástico para a indústria de food-service. 
 Em 2013, a empresa já recuperava da crise económica, que diminuiu a capacidade 
financeira dos seus clientes e contribuiu para o excesso de capacidade produtiva da empresa. 
Apesar de atingir vendas de €12,6 milhões no canal Horeca em 2013, a Progelcone foi 
confrontada com um grande desafio em 2014. Além do forte impacto da sazonalidade, a 
Progelcone perdeu o seu maior cliente, a Olá, uma marca local do negócio dos gelados da 
Unilever. A empresa acreditava que o lançamento da Snapy, uma bolacha wafer, no 
supermercado Jumbo tinha o potencial de aumentar as receitas e contribuir para o 
crescimento da empresa. No entanto, uma categoria dominada por marcas de distribuição e 
concorrentes como a Mondelez, e a falta de conhecimento de gestão de marcas podem impor 
desafios significativos.  
 As estratégias seguidas pela Progelcone são um tema interessante de discussão. O 
Caso de Estudo pode ser utilizado em cursos de estratégia e marketing, incluindo tópicos 
como diversificação, positionamento, o crescente poder das marcas próprias e o poder de 
negociação dos retalhistas. Esta Tese inclui uma revisão de literatura e uma nota de ensino 
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Snapy: A Crispy bite on Grocery Retail  
In April 2014 Progelcone, a Portuguese maker of ice cream cones, launched Snapy, a 
wafer cookie, for retailers in the mass distribution channels. 
Cones and ice cream – related products for ice cream stores and other food providers 
were the core business of the company, whose seasonality was a longtime challenge for Artur 
Catarino, the founder of Progelcone. 
Serving supermarkets and other retail chains could be an alternative to overcome this 
problem. Due to the European debt crisis, retail companies had become price sensitive and 
focused on private labels. Nevertheless, Catarino felt that this new business would keep the 
company going forward. 
Would the company have what it took to succeed in the supermarket world?  
Company Background 
Progelcone started from scratch. When Catarino lost his first company after the 1974 
political revolution in Portugal, he was forced to leave Mozambique and return to Portugal, 
his home country. However, his passion for ice cream made him build the company of his 
dreams. 
Progelcone, headquartered in Abóboda (see exhibit 1), was a reflection of the 
ambition and entrepreneurial mindset of Catarino. The company started its activity in 1983 as 
a pioneer producer of wafer cones (see exhibit 2), for industrial and artisanal ice cream 
producers. 
The company’s activity grew exponentially when Catarino signed a contract with Olá 
in 1985. At that time, the wafer cones produced by Progelcone were sold to ice cream parlors 
and a few restaurants and hotels.  
Olá was the leader on the impulse category (e.g. Cornetto, Magnum), sold in 
restaurants, cafeterias and ice cream parlors (see exhibit 3), and take-home ice cream 
categories. When Olá deactivated its wafer cones factory, Progelcone became its main 
supplier. Two years later, the small factory had sales of 2 million euros, and 100% of the 
wafer cones national market.  
In 1995, Olá represented 60% of the business but the sector was not growing, which 
led Progelcone to broaden its portfolio. The expansion of the international fast food chains 
allowed the firm to expand its field of activity. In the same year, Progelcone imported 
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disposable food packaging and then sold it to fast food chains. Up to that time, 30 people 
worked in the factory and 10 in the commercial department.  
Trying to respond to its customers needs Progelcone added professional hygiene and 
cleaning products to its portfolio. Furthermore, the firm started the production of plastic 
cutlery, ice cream spoons and bowls, and tube, whiskey and shot glasses for the food-service 
industry (see exhibit 4), supplying clients like McDonald’s, Ibersol and Jerónimo Martins. 
By offering a large portfolio at competitive prices and creating time saving and simple 
purchase processes, the wafer cones maker was also capable of controlling its clients 
inventory, allowing them to minimize costs.  
During the nineties, Progelcone opened two distribution centers, in Albufeira (Algarve) and 
Maia (Porto), and acquired for 5 million euros the wafer cone maker Penguin, which allowed 
an increase in the production capacity and the modernization of the old cones factory. 
By 2006, the company produced up to 120 million cones per year. Around 10% were 
for Olá and the remaining for the HORECA channel. That same year, 1,5€ million out of 
18,5€ in sales came from international markets. Therefore, in 2007, with the acquisition of a 
wafer cone factory in Alicante, Spain, Catarino decided to start the company’s 
internationalization process. Spain became the second most important market for the 
company, with sales of 300.000€ by the end of 2007. 
With the European crisis in 2008 almost 30.000 Portuguese companies were bankrupt 
and Progelcone was struggling with the decreasing financial capacity of its clients. The 
emergence of the economic crisis changed the consumer’s behavior: instead of going out for 
lunch or dinner, the Portuguese prefered to eat at home or even prepare their own meals to 
bring to the office; instead of going on vacations, the nearby beach was perfect to spend the 
summer. All these factors had a profound impact in the performance of ice cream parlors, 
hotels and restaurants, as they were not a priority to consumers. 
Sales decreased and production was down, so in 2012 Catarino had to fire around 
25% of employees and concentrate his efforts in finding a way to bring back the company to 
a sustainable level. 
At the end of 2013, Progelcone was already recovering, with sales coming from the 
HORECA channel of approximately €12,6 million. At that time, ice cream cones represented 
29% of the business. The national ice cream market had been growing steadily since 2009, 
both in value and volume, being worth €615,4 million in 2014. Although Portugal was 
characterized by its hot weather, the portuguese annual ice cream consumption was 4 liters 
per person, below the European average of approximately 6 liters. Furthermore, the industry 
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was strongly impacted by seasonality, which harmed wafer cones sales during the winter 
season. This difference was evident as summer sales accounted for about 63% of year-round 
sales (see exhibit 5). Therefore, the firm had a higher production capacity than the market 
demand. 
 Although at the end of 2013 Progelcone’s performance had improved and the 
economic crisis was no longer a major threat, the evolution and success of the ice cream 
cones business was again being challenged when the new year started. Olá, the brand that 
represented a big share of the wafer cones sales for Progelcone, started relying on its own 
production for wafer cones. As the machines assigned to the production of wafer cones for 
Olá were stopped, not only the revenues declined, but also the excess capacity increased. The 
small-scale production resulted in an increasing anxiety among the company’s workforce, as 
employees felt that their jobs were at risk. Such scenario pressured the executive team to find 
an alternative to fill this gap.  
The cookies market in Portugal 
The cookies (sweet biscuits) market was generally segmented into American cookies, 
assortment cookies, butter-based cookies, chocolate cookies, cream-filled cookies, plain 
cookies, wafer cookies, artisanal cookies, in-store bakery cookies and egg-based cookies.  
At the end of 2013, the European cookies sales totaled €13.3 billion. Germany 
(14.8%) and Italy (14.7%) represented the majority of the European biscuit market. 40,9% 
was the share of the remaining smaller markets and Portugal. Portugal however, only 
accounted for a small part of it (see exhibit 6). 
The consumption of cookies had always been present in the Portuguese food habits, 
usually associated with moments of snacking. In 2013, the consumption of cookies per capita 
in Portugal was 6.13 kg, above the European average (4.82 kg). In fact, cookies were the 4th 
most purchased category in the country, only surpassed by fruits, vegetables and cheese. 
Ending December 2013, annual sales totaled €13.59 million (see exhibit 7 and 8).  
Mondelez Portugal was the leading player in the Portuguese cookies market in 2013 
with a market share of approximately 29%. The high popularity of brands like Oreo, Triunfo, 
Belgas and Chipmix, and the high investment in advertising and product innovation 
contributed to the company’s success. It was followed by Adam Foods, with brands like 
Cuétara, Filipinos and Chiquilín.  
11 
The Portuguese backery&cereals distribution market, which included the category of 
cookies, was leaded by food & drink specialists, such as bakery stores, with a  46,97% market 
share in 2013, followed by hypermarkets and supermarkets, with 33.90% (see exhibit 9). 
Among the different segments of the cookies category, the cream-filled cookies contributed 
the most to the sweet cookies category in Portugal (20,11%), followed by the plain cookies 
(16,39%), especially due to the aggressive positioning of Maria type in mass distribution 
channels. Maria, one of the most consumed cookies by Portuguese families, was worth 24% 
in volume and 10% in value of national sales in 2007.  
Although Portuguese families bought cookies as many times as they bought meat, 
milk and yogurt, the sales volume was decreasing by 2.4% since 2013.  The national cookies 
market was disappointing due to several factors.  
Firstly, the tight financial situation of many Portuguese households had changed the 
consumer behavior in mass distribution channels. Consumers became highly price sensitive, 
more demanding and informed. Planning their visits to stores was an increasing trend. 
Products associated with moments of pleasure, such as cookies, were considered to be a 
luxury, thus coming at the end of the shopping list.  
Secondly, planned purchases were aided by promotional flyers and in store discounts. 
Although portuguese shoppers bought less on each visit and were also reducing the number 
of visits, consumers chose brands depending on promotions, due to the increasing 
promotional activity within the modern distribution retail stores. In 2013, 28% of Portuguese 
families purchases were items on promotion, which increased 4,3pp since 2012. The usually 
path was to buy familiar brands to store and look for the same promotion in the next visit. 
However, if this promotion was not available, more than half of consumers would not buy the 
brand again.  
Thirdly, the perception of private labels was improving among Portuguese consumers, 
who considered them as a good alternative to brands from manufacturers. However, the 
market share of distribution brands had decreased from 42,5% in 2012 to 40,8% in 2013, due 
to the intense promotional activities of manufacturer brands. The competition that was 
already intense, was becoming even fiercer. In 2013, private labels accounted for 29,4% of 
shelf space in the cookies category. Among manufacturer brands, Cuétara had the highest 
share of shelf space (7,7%), followed by Vieira de Castro (5,2%) and Gullón (5,0%).  
Lastly, health categories, such as fruits, yogurts and teas, were outpacing indulgent 
categories, as health and wellbeing started playing an important role among Portuguese 
families. Therefore, producers focused on the diversification of their portfolios, and launched 
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variants under existing brands, especially healthy cookies, to attract the interest of consumers 
who were concerned about health issues and willing to try new products. Industry players 
also invested on packaging innovation, as individual packages were gaining more followers, 
due to its ease of transport and preservation of quality. 
Snapy - your daily snack  
The dilemma  
A couple of months before the launch of Snapy, on a rainy January 2014 day, Luis 
Catarino, Catarino’s youngest son and member of the executive team of Progelcone, had an 
idea to sell decoration wafers to ice cream parlors. A travel lover and father of two daughters, 
Luis did not finish his architecture degree, but working with his father at a young age made 
him fall in love with the business world. 
Pressured to find ways to increase revenues, Luis finally found an appealing product, 
in line with Progelcone’s business. In his father’s office, Luis explained the product and how 
they would sell it. With a skeptical but curious look, Catarino immediately started thinking 
about the production, the ingredients, suppliers and massive sales. 
Using the wafer cones machine to produce wafer cookies seemed like the idea they 
had always looked for. However, the challenge did not only lie in the positioning of the brand 
on the consumers mind, but also in the decision of which distribution channel to use, as Luis 
was not so sure as Catarino that selling in modern distribution would be a good idea. 
Progelcone had three options regarding the point of sale: hotels, restaurants and ice cream 
parlors, which were immediately excluded, since this alternative would not completely solve 
the seasonality problem; vending machines, which seemed a great alternative, since they 
worked the whole year; or hypermarkets, supermarkets and smaller stores, which would be a 
risky move due to the lack of experience in the field and the intense competition.  
On one hand, vending machines allowed the possibility to sell small packages, with 
four or five cookies. Moreover, due to the increasing busy lifestyle, vending machines were 
becoming more appealing for several customers’ segments and were located in strategic 
places such as hospitals, schools and companies. However, vending machines only 
represented 1,72% of the bakery&cereals distribution value. Furthermore, the few companies 
operating in this sector (Sogenave and Super 2000) controlled the whole market, requiring 
extremely high margins. Therefore, Progelcone did not see it as the best option.  
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On the other hand, mass distribution channels represented a high risk to the firm, 
since it did not have experience in brand management and local consumers, but rather a very 
consolidated point-of-sale knowledge. Moreover, selling in supermarkets was a synonym of 
low profit margins, high volume, intense competitive environment, high investment in 
differentiation factors and promotions, and the product turnover was different from what it 
was used to.  
When digging into the subject, choosing grocery retailers would give the company the 
possibility to take advantage from nationwide coverage, economies of scale and lower cost of 
distribution, due to large quantity deliveries. The main disadvantage for the firm was related 
to how the product was positioned in store, once it could not fit in with what the company 
was seeking. Using an intermediary to sell its products meant handing over a substantial 
control on promotion and price to modern distribution channels. The costs involved in having 
a product displayed in the desired place and in the balance of control over the product were 
high. Additionally, the acceptance of the products among the targeted group would determine 
the future of Progelcone in a grocery retail chain. If the product turnover did not match the 
retailers expectations, Snapy would be delisted without informing the company.  
The decision 
Catarino was sure that he aimed to target home consumption and to be present in 
different insignias, all around the country, which would lead to a high volume of boxes 
annually sold. At the same time, the firm was looking for a soft entry in the market, with low 
costs and a low intensity competitive environment. Therefore, the firm was open to negotiate 
exclusive distribution rights, such as unique flavors and brand exclusivity. 
Before choosing the first retail company to approach, Progelcone took into 
consideration different characteristics of this competitive industry, especially variety and  
location. Supermarkets and discount stores were located closer to residential areas and there 
were much more stores compared to hypermarkets. However, these retail formats were 
characterized by a limited assortment of products and a high share of private labels. 
Therefore, the competition was fiercer and Progelcone would have a hard time to enter the 
market. On the contrary, hypermarkets had fewer number of stores, but occupied much larger 
areas. Moreover, hypermarkets offered a wide assortment of products and had entire aisles 
for cookies, while in smaller formats the space was usually half the aisle or less. However, 
large-format stores were losing their appeal to Portuguese consumers.  
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Progelcone considered several possibilities to start: Continente and Jumbo 
hypermarkets; Pingo Doce and Intermarché, supermarkets; and lastly, Lidl discount store. 
At the end of 2013, Pingo Doce has been considered the cheapest supermarket in 
Portugal, which Progelcone considered as a great opportunity, as Portuguese consumers 
trusted this grocery retailer. By the beginning of 2014, the supermarket operator owned by 
Jerónimo Martins Group, was the leading retailer in Portugal, with approximately 370 stores
1
 
(see Exhibit 10). Pingo Doce was located closer to residential areas, and was focused on 
quality and proximity, providing its clients a high customer service.  
Continente, owned by Sonae Group, was the second largest player in the Portuguese 
mass distribution channels. Mainly located in big shopping centers, Continente combined 
large assortments with very competitive prices and customer care. Intermarché, the French 
supermarket chain owned by Les Mousquetaires Group, was also considered by the company. 
The stores were usually located in medium sized cities, and offered quality products with 
competitive prices. However, Intermarché had a unique business system in Portugal, 
franchising. Each store was managed by its owner, which meant that Progelcone had to hire a 
salesperson to sell its products store by store, all around the country. Lidl was focused on 
simplicity and on the best quality at the best price. The German discount supermarket chain 
with a “no-frills strategy” invested in exclusive brands and private-label goods. Lidl used 
marketing to convince consumers that it did not compromise on quality despite its low prices. 
These options seemed a good opportunity to Progelcone, by one reason or another. 
However, Jumbo was the one selected to market Snapy, in April 2014. The hypermarket 
chain from the Auchan Group was known for its large product selection, fair prices and 
customer care. Although Jumbo had fewer stores than competing brands, Progelcone was 
already familiar with the grocery retailer and according to Catarino, “We were still 
recovering from the crisis and there was a clear need to boost the installed production 
capacity. Jumbo had fewer stores than Continente, but the strategy was very similar. They 
invested in quality brands, and we offered a good price-quality relationship. Also, entering 
Jumbo meant that we had the possibility to enter in Pão de Açúcar
2
 afterwards. It was the 
perfect opportunity to increase sales and keep the machinery occupied, and quickly become a 
vehicle of growth. ” 
 
 
                                               
1
 Canadean, April 2015 
2
 Supermarket chain owned by Auchan Group  
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Marketing Mix  
Product  
While flour, fat and aroma were ingredients for the cookies offered by several firms, 
sugar and salt were ingredients whose market was dominated by very few companies. 
Therefore, the firm’s main goal was to please the largest amount of consumers using the 
resources and suppliers already available.  
The immediate focus was to create more than one flavor. The introduction of new 
products in the future and complementing the brand portfolio was a strategy to gain shelf 
space in hypermarkets, supermarkets and discount stores. Hence two distinct flavors were 
created: caramel and chocolate (see exhibit 11). 
Snapy was created as a fine and crispy wafer cookie with soft sweetness and aroma, 
an extension of the caramel and chocolate cones already produced by the firm. The product 
was thought to be sold to retail companies in boxes of 12 packages, and each unit to be sold 
to customers in a crystal packaging of 250 grams, evidencing the care of artisanal 
manufacture.  
The wafer cookies were low in calories when compared with many cookies in the 
same category, such as Maria and Torrada, although consumer health was not the main 
concern for the company. The composition of the product was displayed on the front of the 
package and Progelcone wanted to convey that the use of basic ingredients could generate 
amazing flavors. 
Price 
The definition of the retail price was based on two aspects: firstly, the value charged 
by competitors, including private labels, who offered cookies with similar characteristics; 
secondly, supermarket’s markup for each product. Hence, Catarino had set a retail price of 
1,12€, which seemed to be an affordable price for 250 grams of cookies: “When compared 
with other cookies in the same category we offered first, an excellent quality and care, and 
second, a really good price”.  
 
Place 
Due to its core business in the HORECA channel, Progelcone already had its own 
distribution system. After the production of the cookies in the company’s factory, Progelcone 
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was responsible to deliver the boxes of wafer cookies in the retailers’ distribution centers, 
who then managed the delivery to the stores, all around the country.   
Promotion 
New trends in the consumption of cookies and in the promotional activity were 
impacting Portuguese consumer behavior. At the beginning of 2014, Portuguese consumers 
were addicted to the use of promotional flyers
3
 and in store discounts. The preference for 
planned purchases increased by 7 pp since 2013. However, consumers adapted their behavior 
but did not purchase more.    
Having a high belief in the quality of the product, a tight budget and lack of 
experience in the field, Progelcone did not considered promotional strategies in store as a 
priority to launch its new brand. “When this business opportunity appeared the company 
needed to grow without much investment, because it was financially constrained. The 
combination of that with the lack of know how in the industry made us only assure the basic 
of the marketing mix (the product, price and place). The rest would come with time and 
experience.”, stated one of the company’s managers.  
The alternative was to create strategies of communication and promotion through 
word of mouth, by the announcement of the brand on the website and at the company’s 
facebook page. 
Although consumers did not visit the company’s website regularly, trade clients from 
the firm’s key distribution channel did. Hence, the website was always updated and 
represented an important vehicle to communicate and to create business opportunities.  
Facebook was the most used channel to communicate with consumers, although the firm’s 
presence in this platform was weak, with a low number of followers and almost no 
interaction. 
Creating a brand  
The wafer cookie was the company’s core and Catarino knew that no other company 
in the industry was replicating such quality. Creating a strong presence in consumers minds 
and drawing their attention to that fact was a difficult challenge, due to the low cost strategy 
the company agreed on.  
Luis Catarino was confident that quality was not the only factor that mattered and that 
branding was pivotal to stand out from the crowd in such a competitive environment. 
                                               
3
 Nielsen, July 2014 
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Therefore, his creativity and detail orientation gave him the opportunity to be in charge of the 
brand name and the visual elements. The brand name started as Snap, to evoke the crispness 
of the cookie in the consumers’ mind. However, the name was not legally approved and was 
immediately changed to Snapy. Although the cookies produced by the company was a wafer, 
and therefore could be displayed close to the wafer cookies segment, Luis wanted to position 
Snapy in the plain cookies segment. He wanted to compete with the most consumed cookies 
in Portugal, the Maria type. 
 Regarding the visual elements of the brand “I wanted to give the brand a clean image 
that was visible, appealing, and different from the ones that already existed . The use of 
crystal packaging would also give that image to the brand: it was simple, handcrafted and 
consumers were able to see the product, which is still one of the most important factors of 
why we sell it.” stated Luis.  
The success of the brand was not only associated with the quality of the product but 
also with its packaging. Luis claimed that “The package chosen was a way not to invest in 
new equipments. We bought the plastic packaging to one of our suppliers, which made the 
process much easier. At the end of the process we only needed few people to weld it. It was 
the perfect combination: it was a very manual process, but in line with the positioning we 
wanted to give to the brand.”.  
The way this process was conducted is probably related to organization culture. “ If 
we have an idea we will just find a way of doing it. Of course, if we wanted to sell our 
products massively, we knew we would have an increase in volume and therefore we would 
need to buy new machinery. But at that time, this was the way we found to start the business, 
otherwise we would still be looking for options.” argued Luis. 
 Conclusion  
In early 2014 the Portuguese consumer confidence was growing
4
, but grocery retail 
spending was stagnant. Changing industry trends, such as consumer behavior, shopping in a 
planned and thoughtful way and increasing competition of private labels, created a difficult 
challenge to Progelcone. 
The company’s strategy was clear since the beginning: the firm aimed to cover the 
Portuguese territory and turning Snapy into the most consumed cookie among Portuguese 
consumers. If Snapy was displayed in all grocery retailers shops, it would bring 
                                               
4
 Banco de Portugal, April 2018 
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approximately an €2.5 million increase in the total sales of the business by the end of the first 
year and would complement the ice cream cones seasonal market. 
Catarino and his son knew that standing out in a tough environment, surrounded by 
experienced and powerful companies, was not going to be an easy challenge. However, they 
felt it was time to jump on the opportunity to take the company to the next level. Was 
Progelcone making the right decision? Did Snapy have what it took to succeed? Did the 














Exhibit 1 - Progelcone’s Headquarters  
 
 
Source: Progelcone Website 
 
Exhibit 2 - Ice cream wafer cones produced by Progelcone 
Vintage and Royal wafer cones 
 
 
Old Fashion wafer cones 
 
 
Artesanos wafer cones 
 
 






Bowls and Cups 
 
 
Source: internal information Progelcone 
Exhibit 3 - Olá poster used in restaurants, cafeterias and ice cream parlors 
 
 
Source: Olá Website 
 
Exhibit 4 - Additional products in Progelcone’s portfolio  
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Source: internal information Progelcone 
 
 




Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
2013 6,53% 4,06% 6,11% 8,45% 11,34% 12,96% 17,22% 14,43% 6,00% 4,90% 3,74% 4,27% 
2014 3,65% 8,43% 7,54% 8,81% 12,63% 11,25% 17,02% 11,74% 6,67% 4,31% 4,26% 3,69% 
 






Exhibit 6 - Europe biscuits market geography segmentation: % share, by value, 2014 
 
 
Source: “Biscuits in Europe”, November 2015, Marketline 
 
Exhibit 7 - Portugal cookies market value (€ million) and market share in value terms (%) by 
category (2011 - 2014) 
 




















Source: Marketline database 
Exhibit 10 - Leading grocery retailers in the Portuguese food market, 2013-2014 
 
Source: Statista, release date: May 2014 
 
Exhibit 11 - Snapy flavors  
 
 
Source: Progelcone Website 
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II. Literature Review 
 The following chapter aims to address topics related to issues raised by the Case 
Study, which will be useful for the analysis in the Teaching Note. In order to further analyse 
the strategy adopted by Progelcone, this section presents the differences between a business-
to-business and a business-to-consumer market and the challenges of entering a new market, 
the confrontation with private labels and the importance of brand positioning.  
1. Diversifying from business-to-business into business-to-consumer 
Whenever a business enterprise is established, it employs a certain business model, 
which intends to define how the firm will create, deliver and capture value (Johnson, 
Christensen, Kagerrnann, 2008). By defining the manner by which the organization delivers 
value to final customer, either directly or indirectly (Teece, 2010), a company is not required 
to follow one single path. In fact, Rumelt (1974) was able to show that organizations are 
increasingly diversifying its businesses into related or unrelated areas, either in order to grow, 
to spread risk or to create value.  
According to Bettis and Hall (1982), an organization is said to be diversified if it has 
different individual businesses competing in different industries.  For the purpose of the Case 
Study presented, it is, then, important to understand what can differ in an organization that 
operates in business-to-business markets (B2B, also called industrial market) when 
diversifying into business-to-consumer (B2C) markets. 
Several persuasive theoretical works have established reasonings about B2B and B2C 
that define major differences across these markets. According to Lilien and Grewal (2012), 
B2B refers to commercial transactions between two or more firms, whether B2C is defined as 
the commerce between a business and an individual consumer. Lilien (1987) further suggests 
that the most relevant dimensions that establish the uniqueness of B2B markets are: derived 
demand, varying and fragmented market structure, long purchase cycles and multiple 
influences in the decision making process.  
The first difference one may find is related to demand. When operating in industrial 
markets the demand is driven by final consumers’ demand, as buyers aim to meet the needs 
and wants of final consumers. In a product perspective, a buyer may purchase “equipment, 
component parts, maintenance, repair, operating supplies, raw materials and fabricating 
materials”, either to sell to other organizations or to the final consumer (Cooke, 1986).  
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The buying behavior between these two markets also presents its differences, as 
purchase motives in consumer markets tend to be less rational than in the B2B domain 
(Cooke, 1986). Purchases in industrial markets are often influenced by firm’s goals, either the 
maximization of profits or production at the minimum cost possible (Cooke, 1986; Lilien, 
1987). Therefore, the demand for industrial products is usually inelastic and impulse buying 
is often uncommon, as there are constraints regarding which companies to buy from, prices 
and prior and post purchase conditions. Moreover, the decision-making process in B2B 
involves often several individuals, as managers seek different perspectives before making a 
purchase (Lilien, 1987). Instead, in the B2C domain, the decision making process depends 
upon the degree of consumer involvement with a product, advertising and situational context 
(Solomon, 2011). Therefore, the author describes three types of decision making: cognitive, 
which implies that the decision made is deliberated and more rational; habitual, which is 
related to decisions made under little or non conscious effort; and affective, which refers to 
decisions made on the basis of emotional reactions. Although the purchase decision may be 
more complex, the final user is usually the one making the decision to buy a product (Cooke, 
1986). 
 
Ilustração 1Figure 1 - Conceptualizing involvement 
Source: Solomon, M. (2013). Consumer behavior: Buying, having, and being (eleventh edition). 
Pearson. 
 
Other major difference an organization faces when diversifying its business to 
consumer markets is, indeed, related to the structure of the market. The concentration of the 
market is higher in the B2B domain, as markets often have few buyers and sellers, which 
enable firms to establish long-term, complex and informal relationships and relative power 
(Corey, 1983). In order to ensure a smooth relationship, maintain price competition and 
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prevent over dependence, a buyer often has more than one supplier. However, once this 
buyer-seller relationship is established, it is difficult for a new supplier to enter the purchase 
chain, as firms tend to protect its long-term relationships, whether due to mutual respect, 
inertia to changes or fear of new arrangements. In some cases, it is also common to establish 
strategic alliances between the two parties (Cooke, 1986). As stated by Devlin and Bleackley 
(1988) "strategic alliances take place in the context of a company's long-term strategic plan 
and seek to improve or dramatically change a company's competitive position". Therefore, 
industrial organizations often create new firms, named joint ventures, in order to transfer and 
share knowledge (Devlin, Bleackley, 1988).  
Trust and credibility, however, are more difficult to establish in the B2C domain. The 
choice overload pushes consumers to make more rational and efficient choices, seeking the 
minimization of time and effort when buying a product, usually opting for familiar brands. 
Repeated and frequent purchases are, indeed, influenced by the quality of a product. 
However, advertising and promotional activities are the key to differentiate products and win 
consumer’s preferences and loyalty, imposing major challenges to new entrants (Webster, 
1978).  
Furthermore, as industrial purchases usually depend on multiple individuals, certain 
knowledge of the technical nature of the products and higher cost volumes, the process tends 
to be longer in B2B markets than in the B2C domain (Lilien, 1987). Moreover, the 
information availability in industrial markets is significantly different from consumer 
markets: measuring transactions is harder in B2B markets, which makes the decision-making 
process rely on measures of power and long-term relationships between buyers and sellers 
(Lilien, 1987). 
In conclusion, due to the complexity of the industrial domain and the competitive 
environment in business-to-consumer markets, the strategies designed to approach this two 
distinct markets must be different, especially the marketing strategies (Webster, 1978; Cooke, 
1986). 
2. Retailers bargaining power 
Retailers bargaining power have been a subject of intense investigation in the last 
decades, as many believe that the increasing buyer power negatively affects the market, 
although academic literature has not provided the same conclusions (Bloom, Perry, 2001; 
Draganska, Klapper, Villas-Boas, 2010). Therefore, this chapter intends to analyse the 
sources of retailers bargaining power and how it may affect manufacturers performance.  
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Retail markets have experienced recognizable developments, which have further 
influenced consumer behavior. Individuals became more informed and curious on prices, on 
their regular choices and on the quality of the products offered in grocery stores (Dobson, 
2002). Furthermore, firm-size increases, the emergence of new formats, service-level 
differentiation, the introduction of store brands and the prevalence of large retail chains have 
contributed to major changes in the food retail industry (Draganska, Klapper, Villas-Boas, 
2010).  
Many authors suggest that retailers had became a dominant player due to the access to 
scanner technology, which enables traders to get “on time” information of products and thus 
increase its negotiation power (Farris, Alawadi, 1992). In contrast, Dobson (2002) suggests 
that with increasing market concentration and consolidation, grocery retailers became the 
ones managing national brands shares, thus exercising a higher bargaining power in 
comparison with suppliers. According to the same author, a retailer is defined to have buyer 
power if it has the ability of obtaining more favorable trade conditions from suppliers than 
those available to other buyers (Dobson, 2004).  
Following this line, grocery retailers are able to control the supplier-buyer relations to 
their advantage, from its ability to bargain low prices, but also due to the increasing 
complexity of negotiations (Dobson, 2004). The contracts between buyers and suppliers tend 
to also include promotional allowances throughout the year, described as advertising 
expenses. Although promotional activities may bring short-term profits to manufacturers and 
may strength brand loyalty, its frequency influences the price sensitiveness of consumers, 
weakening the negotiating power of suppliers and enhancing the positioning of retailers.  
Large scale retailers may also manifest its power through the use of Most-Favored-
Customer clauses. This specific contractual obligations may provide grocery retailers with 
financial benefits, as suppliers are not able to sell products to other retailers at non-
competitive prices (i.e, at lower prices). Furthermore, manufacturers may see a reduction in 
profits when contracts include exclusive supply conditions, such as flavors or brand name 
exclusivity. By agreeing on this terms, suppliers are losing the opportunity to sell its products 
to different retailers, and thus, giving differentiation advantages over competitors to a certain 
retail chain  (Dobson, 2004; Draganska, Klapper, Villas-Boas, 2010). 
As the retail food industry is characterized by its highly competitive environment, and 
thus a high number of products and limited shelf-space, grocery retailers were forced to 
include slotting allowances in buyer-supplier contracts, i.e. fixed and upfront payments from 
suppliers in order to guarantee shelf-space allocation. In quest for distinctiveness, suppliers 
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fall into a bidding negotiation, trying to offer better deals than competitors (Marx, Shaffer, 
2009). Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the criteria to enter mass distribution channels 
does not lie in higher-quality, but rather in financial capacity. Manufacturers with higher 
market share are often willing to pay more to obtain visibility, creating barriers to small firms 
to enter the market (Marx, Shaffer, 2009). 
Other retail practices may force suppliers to offer conditions of return, or even 
compensate grocery retailers if the expected sales of a certain product are not reached. Hence, 
retailers are able to shift financial risks to suppliers (Dobson, 2004). 
In highly concentrated markets, the disagreements that might emerge between 
retailers and suppliers, whether at the price level or promotional strategies, are often more 
damaging for the latter. The impact on retailers’ profitability if one refuses to stock and 
display a product is small or even null, as it may replace it with alternative products from 
established, potential suppliers or even get space to exploit the role of a competitor, with the 
introduction of private labels. However, for suppliers this may turn into a major problem. As 
there are fewer retailers in the industry capable of stocking a large volume of products, 
suppliers become economically dependent on major retailers (Dobson, 2004). 
The conventional wisdom believed that the factors described above have influenced a 
power shift towards large retailers. However, there is little evidence of retailers increasing 
profitability, which may suggest that the shift in market power may not have occurred. 
Authors in the academic literature used different behavioral and economic measures of 
market power, such as return on sales, return on assets, the impact of advertising expenses 
and the introduction of private labels, but all ended up with the same results. In certain 
markets, some retail chains have indeed gained bargaining power over manufacturers, but 
other retailers have lost power instead (Ailawadi, Borin, Farris, 1995). In what concerns to 
manufacturers, Bloom and Perry (2001) state that in fact, retailers may use its bargaining 
power to extract benefits from manufacturers, as it is possible that suppliers are willing to 
agree on contractual obligations in order to increase market share. Therefore, it is acceptable 
to say that bargaining power may vary across buyers and suppliers (Draganska, Klapper, 
Villas-Boas, 2010).  
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3. Private Labels  
The competitive environment between national brands and private labels has been a 
topic of growing interest in many studies. This section aims to explain the factors that 
influence this competitive interaction within the retail food industry.  
Also known as store brands, private labels are described as brands owned by 
“retailers, wholesalers or distributors” (Dawes, Nenycz-Thiel, 2013), which are usually lower 
priced in comparison with national brands (Park, Kim, 1996). 
Quelch and Harding (1986) wrote, in a Harvard Business Review article, “several 
factors suggest that the private label threat in the 1990s is serious, and may stay that way 
regardless of economic conditions”. Nowadays, private labels are, indeed, an important 
source of profits for retailers with some degree of market power, and a source of competition 
for national brands.  (Dawes, Nenycz-Thiel, 2013).  
The success of store brands can be mainly justified by three factors: costs and benefits 
of private labels, conditions of competition within a category and consumer behavior (Meza, 
2003).  
The investment in private labels creates value for retailers, as there are several 
benefits accruing from its introduction in the market. By finding manufacturers with excess 
capacity, retailers are often able to produce private labels at a low cost (Kotler, 1994). As 
distribution and advertising costs may be low as well, modern distribution players are able to 
have lower end-user prices, and thus higher margins on these products (Parker, Kim, 1996). 
As many consumers are aware of how store brands are manufactured, retailers are able to 
create strong brands, increasing consumer satisfaction and thus store and brand loyalty. 
Furthermore, the launch of store brands increases control of shelf space by retailers and 
creates difficulties by building entry barriers for national brands (Meza, Sudhir, 2010). 
Retailers extended their private label benefits by approaching new and different 
categories, and by investing in its enhanced quality and premium store brands, which imposes 
a major threat to national brands (Quelch, Harding, 1996). In a producer’s perspective, 
modern distribution players are now able to intensify the competition not only through low 
prices, but also through equivalent quality. Hence, retailers are able to provide the same 
“tangible search” and experience as national brands. 
However, Hoch and Banerji (1993) suggest that there are external factors to the core 
of a product that may influence its purchase. In the author's point of view, communication 
and advertisement still play an important role among consumers, as they help in the decision-
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making process and enable manufacturers to establish brand preferences and differentiate 
their products from private label brands. Therefore, manufacturers of national brands tend to 
increase advertising expenditures to protect their brands from private label brands 
competition (Parker, Kim, 1996).  
By introducing store brands in the market, retailers are able to control not only their 
brands’ prices, shelf space and promotions, but also the ones from national brands. The 
pattern seems to be consistent: weaker brands or brands that have low advertisement tend to 
be delisted, giving premium shelf space to private labels (the products are displayed at the 
eye-level, hand-level or at the end of the aisle) and offering limited shelf space to highly 
advertised brands (Weintraub, 1989). As manufacturers fear the decrease in consumers’ 
purchases if characteristics of the product are changed, they tend to use defensive strategies 
as a primary response (Parker, Kim, 1996).  
While most of previous studies about the competitive interaction between private 
labels and national brands generated counterintuitive results, as they were only focused in 
cross-category relationships, the study conducted by Cotterill, Putsis and Ravi Dhar (2000) is 
also focused in intra-category relationships, suggesting two important results. 
Firstly, cross-category results suggest that demand and price strategies response may 
be influenced by the existing store brands’ share within a category. This means that price 
becomes an important factor in categories with a high level of private labels. Therefore, when 
a category is characterized by a high share of private labels, the demand of national brands is 
more sensitive to changes in private labels’ prices, reflecting the threat posed by retailers’ 
brands. In contrast, demand of private label brands is less sensitive to national brands’ prices. 
However, if the price of a national brand increases, its market share decreases, which also 
happens to private label brands. 
Secondly, when referring to horizontal relationships, the authors argue that store 
brands are more likely to struggle in markets where national brands have aggressive 
responses on price. Moreover, retailers indeed use their bargaining power to strategically set 
prices and thus gain market share, especially in locally concentrated grocery markets 
(Cotterill, Putsis and Ravi Dhar, 2000; Meza, Sudhir, 2010). Therefore, this manipulation is 
often made in large mass market brands, as gains in market share may be more valuable to 
retailers (Hoch, Banerji, 1993). 
In fact, private label brands pose significant challenges to manufacturer brands, as the 
intensity of competition and pressure on retail prices increases. However, the consumption of 
store brands tends to be higher mainly during weak economic periods, as consumers become 
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more price sensitive, hence paying more attention to value for money. In contrast, in strong 
economic contexts, with increases in income, national brands tend to have higher market 
shares. Therefore, pricing strategies used by retailers become ineffective (Cotterill, Putsis and 
Ravi Dhar, 2000; Steenkamp, Van Heerde, Geyskens 2010).  
4. Branding in consumer goods 
A brand is a “name, term, sign, symbol, or design, or combination of them which is 
intended to identify the goods and services of one seller or group of sellers and to 
differentiate them from those of competitors” (Kotler, 1991).  
Brands play an important role for manufacturers, as they provide companies with an 
essential marketing tool, and for consumers, as a source of information. Even though it takes 
years to build a brand, manufacturers may be able to generate a source of competitive 
advantage if effectively used (Skinner, 1990). Therefore, a brand helps them to protect unique 
attributes and to build unique associations in consumers’ minds (Grace, O’Cass, 2002). 
Furthermore, brands help consumers to simplify their choices in an overloaded market, as it 
signals a particular quality level, and builds a relationship of promise and trust with the maker 
of the product (Lassar et al., 1995).  
As the power of a brand resides in consumers’ minds and they are continuously trying 
to find a balance between the heart and mind, it is, then, crucial to understand how consumers 
think about and interact with a brand. Therefore, Grace and O’Cass suggest that one may 
understand consumers brand knowledge. The theoretical model developed by Keller (1998), 
which aims to understand the relationship between consumers and product brands, suggests 
that brand knowledge is divided into brand awareness and brand image (Figure 4).  
Brand awareness refers to the easiness of consumers to remember a brand whether by 
recalling or recognizing it (Huang, Sarigöllü, 2014). In fact, creating brand awareness is one 
of the most important goals of a brand manager, as it strongly influences consumer behavior 
and the decision-making process, and thus, the market performance. According to the 
authors, as brand awareness increases it is more likely to be part of the consideration set of 
consumers. However, when it concerns to low involvement products, which do not require an 
intensive search for information, brand choice may be influenced by environmental or 
situational conditions. Therefore, brand awareness in this categories is created by product 
usage experiences and consecutive purchases (Huang, Sarigöllü, 2014). 
In contrast, brand image is said to be the “perceptions about a brand as reflected by 
the brand associations held in consumer memory” (Keller, 1993). The meaning of a brand to 
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consumers results from the strength, favorability and uniqueness of brand associations. The 
author states that those brand associations may take three forms: attributes, attitudes and 
benefits. Attributes can be product-related or not, as they may represent the features of the 
product, as well as the price, usage imagery, personality of the brand, feelings and 
experiences. The benefits refer to the advantages the consumer associate with the 
purchasing/using of the brand and its overall evaluations (Keller, 1993). 
In fact, associative memory and brand associations are essential for brand positioning, 
especially in competitive markets, as they help to establish differentiation factors and a 
superior performance within an industry (Keller, Lehmann, 2006). Although branding has 
been growing as a business priority, many firms are still unsure about how to effectively 
manage brands while maximizing their equity (Keller, 1999). Creating a strong brand implies 
the positioning of a brand externally and internally, as firms need to make sure that also 
employees understand the brands. 
According to Kotler (2000), brand positioning is “the act of designing an 
organization’s offering and image to occupy a distinctive place in the target market’s mind” 
(Kalafatis, Tsogas, Blankson, 2000). Therefore, the choice of positioning strategies is not a 
matter of sales tactics. Instead, when positioning a brand it is important to create customer 
value, as positioning is also the combination of consumers’ perceptions of products and 
brands, which are not completely in control of marketers (Kalafatis, Tsogas, Blankson, 2000). 
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III. Teaching Note 
1. Learning Objectives 
 The present Case Study can be used within strategic management and marketing 
courses. 
The relevance of Progelcone’s real-life challenge relies on the threats and 
opportunities an organization faces when entering an unknown and highly competitive 
industry, which is influenced by consumers’ preferences, industry players’ bargaining power 
and the emergence of private labels.  
Students should be encouraged to build on the company’s strategic thinking, by 
analysing its resources and capabilities as a source of competitive advantage, the external 
environment of the organization, the importance of the positioning of a brand and the use of 
promotional activities to increase brand awareness and associations in consumers’ minds. 
Main topics to be highlighted are:   
 
1.Impact of the internal and external business context in the company’s decisions 
Students should be able to understand the context in which an organization is inserted 
as a critical factor to a successful strategy, applying frameworks such as  PESTEL analysis, 
Porter’s Five Forces and Industry Lyfecycle. 
 
2.Positioning of the firm at a corporate level: cost leadership and differentiation 
strategy. 
Students are expected to determine the strategic position of a company, by using 
frameworks such as Generic Strategies and Ansoff’s Matrix. 
 
3.The nature and sources of competitive advantage  
Students should be capable to understand how a firm may use its valuable resources 
and capabilities in different industries. Concepts like the Research-Based View Theory and 




4.The impact of private labels and promotional activities  
Students should understand the impact of private labels as a threat to a brand’s 
performance, as well as the importance of promotional strategies as a source of brand 
awareness. 
 
5.Future strategies  
Students should be capable of analysing and measuring the attractiveness of the 
industry, more specifically the Cookies industry in Portugal, and suggest improvements to the 
company’s current strategy. 
2. Assignment Questions 
 The following questions are suggested in order to help students to prepare for the in-
class case discussion: 
1. Describe the environmental and market factors that were conditioning Progelcone’s 
performance.   
2. Discuss the strategies followed by Progelcone. 
3. What factors may condition Snapy’s performance? 
4. What recommendations would you give to Catarino and Luis for the future of Snapy? 
 
3. Class Plan 
 In order to help instructors to structure and develop a rich discussion, this section 
suggests possible topics to be addressed in class. 
1. What were the external factors conditioning Progelcone’s performance before the 
launching of Snapy? 
2. Characterize the market where Progelcone was operating before the launching of 
Snapy.  
3. What has been the strategy followed by the firm?  
4. How does the decision to launch Snapy fit into that strategy?  
5. Analyse the cookies market.  
6. What challenges does Progelcone face when dealing with the modern distribution 
industry?  
7. How did Progelcone position Snapy?  
8. What are the problems regarding Snapy that Progelcone may have to face?  




1.What were the external factors conditioning Progelcone’s performance before the 
launching of Snapy? 
Every organization is part of a business environment, which is divided into four 
layers: macro environment, industry, competitors and the company. In order to analyse the 
macro environment of Progelcone, the PEST framework will be used.  
 From 2008 to 2014 the European debt crisis had a profound impact in Portugal. The 
crisis, which affected dozens of Portuguese organizations, had repercussions at the economic 
and political level. The Portuguese financial rescue program introduced by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2011 prevailed until 2014. The reduction in salaries and raising 
taxes influenced Portuguese consumption and completely changed consumers’ behavior. The 
consumption was down and as a result, industrial companies were struggling with the 
decreasing financial capacity of its clients. 
At a social level, Portuguese families started prioritizing what was essential to their 
daily life, not spending money on what was considered a pleasure or a luxury. As a result of 
the economic crisis, consumers became highly price sensitive, more demanding in regard to 
convenience and products’ diversification and more informed about the products they 
intended to purchase. Moreover, promotional activities influenced consumers’ purchases, as 
families planned their visits to the stores according to promotional flyers and store discounts. 
Finally, the use of the Internet was evolving among Portuguese consumers. Therefore, 
technology friendly companies were investing in social networks to build close relationships 
with customers. 
 
Table 1 - PEST analysis 
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2.Characterize the market where Progelcone was operating before the launching of 
Snapy.  
Progelcone was a commercial specialist operating in the business-to-business market, 
either by selling ice cream cones and related products, or disposable food packaging and 
professional hygiene and cleaning products to other organizations, ice cream parlors, 
restaurants and hotels. 
Progelcone operated in a highly concentrated market, as there were few sellers and 
multiple buyers. The business was geographically concentrated in Portugal as the availability 
of resources, raw materials, labour, managerial and technical expertise may warrant 
geographical concentration. Moreover, Progelcone did not feel the need to invest in visual 
differentiation factors, as its product’s quality and the conditions offered spoke for the 
business itself.  
Furthermore, because Progelcone’s business involved large orders and long term 
relationships, as it happened with Olá for 29 years, the process from the first pitch to closing 
a sale was often more complex than the purchasing process between an organization and a 
private customer. Buyers in this industrial market were highly knowledgeable about the 
products they needed, hence the decision making process tended to be very rational and 
involved several managers. Although Progelcone invested in time saving and simple purchase 
processes, these required very well trained professionals, capable of formalizing purchases in 
the shortest possible time. Additionally, by deeply understanding each of its clients 
businesses, the company was able to better schedule supplies, keep the costs down and 
benefit from joint demand. For instance, the demand of soup bowls normally implied the 
purchase of spoons as well. Therefore, buyers had high switching costs. 
When the economic recession took over Europe, the purchasing power of its clients 
declined drastically and so did Progelcone’s business. Although the demand of many 
industrial products was not highly price sensitive, such as the salt and sugar markets, 
Progelcone did not share the same principle. Its market was highly influenced by consumers’ 
needs and wants and therefore, very sensitive on price. Moreover, the use of penetration 
pricing strategies was also common, as competitors used low price practices to attract buyers 
and gain market share.   
Finally, because of high profit margins, companies operating in the B2B domain did 




3.What has been the strategy followed by the firm?  
The evolution of Progelcone was a result of several growth strategies. In order to 
better explain the strategy followed by the company, Porter’s Generic Strategies and Ansoff’s 
Matrix will be used.  
Progelcone was the leader in the supply of ice cream and food products and was 
indeed the pioneer of wafer cones production in Portugal. Although it started as manufacturer 
of wafer cones, its business success spurred it to diversify into selling and producing plastic 
items for the food-service industry. Furthermore, Progelcone has also expanded to Algarve, 
Porto and Spain and now has clients around the world and a very consolidated delivery and 
logistic system. 
According to Ansoff’s Matrix, Progelcone’s corporate strategy can be described as 
diversification. This strategy is based on leveraging logistic and manufacturing capabilities 
for business success and following a cost leadership strategy aimed at offering the maximum 
value for its clients. Moreover, the generic business strategy followed by the company may 
be explained through the use of Porter’s Generic Strategies. Progelcone followed an overall 
cost leadership as it increased profits by reducing costs, while charging industry-average 
prices. 
The pursuit of this strategy could be accessed through the efficiency of its operations 
and increased service levels. Progelcone was able to ensure low prices and a smooth 
customer experience through time saving and simple purchasing processes, and the 
optimization of orders and inventory. Based on its inventory system management, Progelcone 
was able to create a convenience advantage wherein clients did not need to go through the 
purchasing process all over again as demand patterns enabled an automatic replenishment 
process.  
Furthermore, Progelcone’s strategy was driven by the benefits taken from parenting 
advantage in its businesses and leveraging the network and long term relationships with its 
clients. By having a deep understanding of its clients’ businesses, Progelcone could also 
benefit from suggestions of complementary products, thus seeking also a product 
development strategy. Although it allows a broader scope of the business, the danger lied in 
the company’s exposure to one type of customer. Additionally, by offering complementary 
products, Progelcone was attracting new competitors to the market, as the company offered 
products traditionally sold by these new competitors. 
Concluding, Progelcone’s diversification strategy meant that its portfolio was indeed 
unique, allowing to offset the seasonality of the ice cream business and thus, reduce the 
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overall risk of the business. However, it was a risky growth strategy, as some of the 
businesses, such as the production of plastic items for the food-service industry, required the 
development of new resources and capabilities.  
 
4.How does the decision to launch Snapy fit into that strategy?  
 To better answer if Snapy has a strategic fit with Progelcone’s strategy, the concept of 
parenting advantage and the Porter’s Value Chain framework will be used. 
The problem of seasonality faced by Progelcone in the ice cream industry was in part 
relieved by the adoption of a diversification strategy. However, when Olá dropped 
Progelcone as its main supplier, the company’s efforts to stabilize the business were highly 
affected by a rising excess capacity. 
Continuously seeking a growth strategy and pressured to increase revenues, 
Progelcone decided to adapt its existing products, the wafer cones, and enter the modern 
distribution industry. By following a market development strategy the company was indeed 
able to increase its revenues. However, it was not absolutely clear that it would be able to add 
value to this particular business and if it would be able to add more value than any other 
company already operating in this sector. 
Based on Porter’s Value Chain, one may identify the inbound and outbound logistics, 
operations and technology development as the areas from which Snapy could benefit. 
The research and development of new flavors was crucial to the technology 
development area and for the product innovation followed by Progelcone, which may be 
understood by observing exhibit 2. In fact, the variety, quality and crispiness of the wafer 
cones was recognized among the company clients and final consumers. By using the same 
ingredients and suppliers from the wafer cones to the production of Snapy, Progelcone was 
able to take advantage from economies of scale.  
Furthermore, as stated in the case, there was relatedness at the operational level. 
Firstly, the manufacturing processes of the cookies and of the wafer cones were very similar. 
Secondly, Progelcone had its own distribution system and facilities from operating in the 
HORECA channel. By sharing this resources and the capabilities from managing its 
processes and activities, Snapy’s business would be able to take advantage from economies 
of scope. At the strategic level there were also similarities. The company was able to apply 
strategies from its core business (parenting advantage), such as the resource allocation 
processes, management skills and the control of inventory, either from the company or from 
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its clients. From this point of view the company’s resources and capabilities were able to add 
value to Snapy’s business and thus, the decision of launching Snapy did fit Progelcone’s 
corporate strategy.  
Nevertheless, it is important to mention that the retail industry was highly dependent 
on the economic well being of the country. Although consumer confidence was rising, 
consumers were not spending more and indulgent categories were at the end of the shopping 
lists. Therefore, the economic uncertainty would be a challenge for Progelcone, as it could 
rapidly lead the company to fall back again into excess capacity problems. Moreover, the lack 
of specific knowledge about brand management and creating a strong identity to attract the 
target group in an overloaded marketplace could, indeed, limit the customer experience and 
thus, Snapy’s performance.  
The shift in the balance of power towards large retailers would also impose a barrier 
to a company that had never operated in the field. Dealing with the sharks of the modern 
distribution would imply high flexibility in contractual conditions and working with low 
margins, a topic that will be further addressed in question 6. However, having served such a 
powerful client as Olá for 29 years might have prepared the company to lead the change from 
a fragmented market, such as the HORECA channel, to a highly competitive industry as mass 
retailing, by setting clear and tangible expectations. 
 
5.Analyse the cookies market.  
In order to properly analyse the cookies market in Portugal, it is important to guide 
the analysis through the Porter’s Five Forces framework and the concept of  the Industry Life 
Cycle.  
The consumption of cookies wheather at breakfast, between meals or as a snack, has 
always been present in the Portuguese food habits. As we can observe in Exhibit 7, the 
Portuguese cookies market value has been increasing from 2011 to 2014. Although the 
growth rates are considerable low, the consumption of cookies per capita in Portugal was 
higher than the European average (6.13kg and 4.82 kg respectively).  
When observing the Industry Life Cycle in figure 1 it is acceptable to say that the 
cookies industry was in the mature stage, as it is characterized by a saturated market, with 
well established products and producers. In this phase the techniques used to attract 
consumers reach an advanced degree of  refinement. The market may still grow, but at a more 
regular and predictable rate. As the few large players that remain in the industry operate to 
prevent changes and defend its position, Progelcone would have a hard time to gain market 
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share. Additionally, consumers know what to look for and suppliers know the market’s needs, 
thus product innovation decreases and product differentiation relies on supplemental product 
offerings. Therefore, R&D shifts towards process innovation and the key success factor is 
cost efficiency. Such scenario suggests that Progelcone would incur in increasing costs, and 
that the cookies industry may not be attractive to operate. 
 
 
Ilustração 2Figure 2 - Cookies industry life cycle 
 
In order to better determine the intensity of competition and the overall level of 
profitability of the industry, the Porter’s Five Forces framework will be used. 
 
Threat of New Entrants: High 
  
As mentioned in the case, the Portuguese cookies market was characterized by 
multiple players. However, the barriers to entry may be significantly high. However, brand 
preferences and customer loyalty towards larger and more established companies played an 
important role in the industry. Also, the access to distribution channels was not so easy, 
firstly due to the emergence of private labels and secondly because of the concentration of the 
retail industry. Other obstacles to new entrants may may be related to economic factors: the 
initial investment in a manufacturing plant, equipment, ingredients, advertising and 
promotional strategies.   
 
Buyers Bargaining Power: High 
  
The buyers in the cookies industry can be divided in two different groups: the 
individuals that actually purchased and consumed the cookies and the retailers who sold the 
product to final consumers. However, the major buyers were, in fact, retailers, as 
manufacturers did not sell directly to the final consumer. Although the retail food industry 
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had few players in Portugal, they also played the role of competitors with the sales of private 
labels. By introducing store brands, retailers were able to control the prices of national 
brands, shelf space allocation and also promotional activities, thus increasing their bargaining 
power over time. Moreover, consumers’ loyalty to brands that already have a recognizable 
path in the industry gives retailers more power regarding new entries.     
 
Threat of Substitute Products: High 
 
The category of cookies is extremely price sensitive. Therefore, when we think about 
the ultimate consumer of cookies, we may find numerous substitutes of cookies, not only in 
terms of brands, but also in terms of different categories. As the case study mentions, the 
consumption of fruit, yogurt and tea in moments of pleasure was increasing among 
Portuguese consumers, as health and well-being started playing an important role in society. 
Moreover, as consumers may choose from a high number of alternatives and according to 
their main preferences, the switching costs are low or even null.   
Suppliers Bargaining Power: Moderate/Low 
 
The suppliers in the cookies industry include suppliers of flour, salt, oats, flavorings 
and starch. On one hand there were very few suppliers of sugar and salt. As these two 
markets had very strict rules and the prices were rigidly set, manufacturers did not have the 
possibility to negotiate. As a result, switching from one supplier to another was not often 
considered by organizations. On the other hand, all the other suppliers were numerous and 
small, which enabled firms to switch suppliers without harming its businesses. Therefore, 
suppliers represented a moderate to low competitive force.  
 
Rivalry among competitors: Very high 
 
The biscuit market in Portugal was fragmented and the principal competitors were 
large and very well established. The main competitors included Mondelez, with brands like 
Oreo and Milka, Adam Foods, with the brand Cuétara, Vieira de Castro, Gullón and store 
brands, which have been increasing acceptance among consumers and shelf-space allocation. 
Moreover, the cost of switching to rival brands was very low, and the increasing promotional 
sales from manufacturer brands was threatening competition. Therefore, it is acceptable to 
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say that the industry is characterized by a highly competitive environment, which could limit 
Snapy’s performance. 
 
According to the industry life cycle presented above, one can argue that the cookies 
industry attractiveness was moderate to low. The industry profitability was depressed due to 
the emergence of private labels offering good value for money, the promotional activities 
from national brands to fight competition and due to the strong bargaining power of retailers, 
whose control squeezed manufacturers margins. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that 
the segment of healthy cookies still had room to grow, although many competitors were 
already pursuing it.  
 
6.What challenges does Progelcone face when dealing with the modern distribution 
industry?  
The relationships between manufacturers and retailers often involve a complex 
combination of cooperation and competition.  
          When observing exhibit 10 is it clear that the Portuguese grocery retail market is 
highly concentrated, being Jerónimo Martins and Sonae the main players, with a jointly 
market share of 40%. As a consequence of concentration there is a growing imbalance of 
bargaining power, which has economic and social effects on manufacturers and consumers 
either through innovation, reduction of choice or increasing retail prices.  
         The power shift towards retailers imposes several challenges to Progelcone. By 
engaging with modern distribution, Progelcone has a limited decision making power, as the 
dominance of grocery retailers enables them to effectively determine what will be displayed 
on shelves, and in which conditions: sources, quantity, quality, delivery terms and schedules, 
packaging, policy of returns, and more importantly, price and payment conditions. The 
increasing market share of the main players, enables them to negotiate better deals over time. 
By increasing business efficiency and offering promotions, grocery retailers are capable of 
decreasing retail prices, squeezing Progelcone’s margin even more. 
The changes in consumer preferences and stiff competition are driving food retailers 
to reevaluate their store and brand portfolios. In order to optimize capital allocation and 
alternative growth strategies, the format of grocery retailers is also being challenged. As 
small formats had gained importance in the industry, Progelcone may have difficulties in 
entering such chains. Additionally, in order to ensure that Snapy receives shelf space, 
Progelcone may have to pay slotting fees, which represent an additional high cost for a new 
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entrant in the market and shifts the risk of stocking new products towards the company. 
Moreover, as the market share of the cookies category is concentrated in few and large 
players, such as Mondelez, who can afford to pay high amounts of money to guarantee 
premium shelf space, Progelcone faces increasing barriers to operate in grocery chains. 
Apart from this, by being open to negotiate exclusive conditions with grocery chains, 
such as unique flavors and brand exclusivity, Progelcone indeed finds a solution to softly 
enter the market, but by doing so, two important challenges arise: firstly, it is affecting the 
availability of Snapy in other retail chains, and secondly, the company loses control over its 
brand and creates difficulties in building a relationship with consumers and strengthening its 
brand identity. Also, Progelcone would also be required to provide extra support to its 
product, such as promotional activities to increase consumer awareness and demand, cost 
control and efficiencies to support continued brand investment and future business plans. 
Grocery retailers play an important role in shaping consumers’ demand. As grocery 
retailers’ power increases, they are strongly capable of influencing what, how and where 
consumers make their purchases. Therefore, one may argue that grocery chains act as 
guardians instead of transmitting consumers’ needs and wants, thus limiting the access of 
Progelcone to final consumers and affecting consumers in a negative way. 
Even though Snapy offers a unique selling opportunity, by engaging with modern 
distribution Progelcone may create a relationship of dependency towards major retailers. 
Refusing to accept its conditions is not an option for the company, as it needs to display its 
products. Therefore, the company may have a hard time dealing with the sharks and may 
have to be flexible about the way of approaching them.  
 
7.How did Progelcone position Snapy?  
 The unique strategic positioning of a brand helps shaping consumers perceptions and 
decision-making behavior. Therefore, strong brands seek a vision and communicate its 
unique value proposition. 
Snapy was a fine and crispy wafer cookie. These delicious yet simple cookies were 
subtly sweet and perfect for families, children and young professionals. As the consumption 
of cookies was highly associated with moments of snacking, Snapy was to be eaten as a 
snack or at breakfast, with coffee or tea. Although the purpose of snacking was changing, as 
customers were seeking more convenient and easily portable on the go consumption, Snapy 
was thought by Progelcone to be an everyday type in a mass produced format.  
45 
This dry cookie allowed a relatively long shelf life and through its crystal packaging. 
Snapy used the visual appeal to reinforce its product as a binding force between adults and 
children. Together with its artisanal image, Luis Catarino aimed to target families and lower 
social classes concerned about the price and quality.  
Since the beginning Progelcone has been focused on Snapy’s characteristics, such as 
the quality of ingredients and new flavors. As far as those dimensions are concerned, Snapy 
has a good quality-price relationship, although consumers may believe there are superior 
brands (Figure 2).  
 
Ilustração 3Figure 3 - Perceptual map of cookies brands: price and quality 
 
Moreover, lifestyle changes among Portuguese families were increasing the 
consumption of healthy products. Snapy was indeed low in calories when compared with 
other brands, but Progelcone did not consider it as an advantage enough to stand out in a 
crowded marketplace. 
Snapy’s brand positioning could create challenges to the company. Firstly, by not 
investing in promotional activities to launch Snapy, Progelcone lost the first contact with 
consumers, as it did not create brand knowledge in consumers’ minds, thus decreasing the 
brand awareness and the establishment of valuable associations to the brand. Secondly, as 
Progelcone was well recognized as a producer of wafer cones since 1983 and its name was 
displayed in the cookies package, Snapy could be perceived as a snack to be consumed in fun 
occasions, accompanied by ice cream or even as a dessert preparation ingredient. Progelcone 
took the risk of not having a clear brand positioning in the market and in its target customers 
minds. Lastly, although it was a low involvement category, Snapy lacked emotional appeal 
46 
(Figure 3). In a highly competitive environment, with large and well established players, 
consumers could easily switch from one brand to another. Therefore, by not creating an 
emotional connection with consumers, the company was not capable of impacting attitudes 
and purchase intentions.  
 
Ilustração 4Figure 4 - Perceptual map of cookies brands: visual and emotional appeal 
 
8.What are the problems regarding Snapy that Progelcone may have to face?  
In 2014 Portugal was still affected by the consequences of the economic debt crisis: 
ongoing price sensitiveness of consumers, changes in the purchase behavior of Portuguese 
families and growth of private labels. Consumers became more economical, conscious and 
responsible about which products were actually worth buying. Planned store visits became a 
trend and consumers purchased brands accordingly to discounts or familiar brands. Such 
situation had a severe impact on indulgent categories. The consumption of cookies was 
purely associated with moments of pleasure and enjoyment and consumers started expecting 
cookies to serve more than a pleasurable need. Furthermore, the empowerment of private 
labels’ growth, created strong and stiff competition for Snapy. In fact, store brands 
contributed to the increase of retailers negotiation power, thus imposing barriers for future 
national brands’ growth and threaten their performance. Therefore, Progelcone will face 
several challenges.   
The bargaining power of food retailers will continue to be a challenge for Progelcone. 
While customers become more demanding and expect great purchase experiences, 
Progelcone may have to face highly exigent components in its sales arrangements. Besides 
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retailers’ ability to negotiate low prices and promotions, as it was mentioned in question 6, 
Progelcone may face requirements for innovative and more efficient ways of sourcing, 
replenish and distributing its products. By providing more accurate tracking of sales and 
profit margins, Progelcone will enable retailers to improve category profitability, but will also 
represent a costly investment for the company. 
As the distribution system evolves, retailers also seek more marketing and 
promotional activities from suppliers, which represents a challenge for Progelcone. Firstly, 
those activities pressure Snapy’s margins. Secondly,  large and established players with 
financial capacity invest in research on consumers’ buying habits to better fit retailers’ needs. 
Therefore, they are more likely to engage in category management, and thus, Snapy’s sales 
may decrease. Also, the increasing acceptance of private labels and concern with the quality 
of these products contributes to retailers’ control over the supplier-buyer relationship. Store 
brands are offered at the lowest price practiced in the industry and enable grocery chains to 
obtain higher margins, hence increasing the competitiveness of the market.  
Furthemore, given the wide product offering of grocery chains, retailers aim to reduce 
costs not only by dealing with suppliers that can provide products over extended seasons, but 
also broader product lines. As providing a broader product line can be risky and costly, large 
and established suppliers are often more capable of supporting these activities. In fact, 
Snapy’s product line did not have a high level of diversification yet. Although the production 
of cookies had a similar process to the production of wafer cones, the company could have 
limited cost advantages from it. In contrast, large players in the cookies market were able to 
benefit from economies of scope, hence, imposing barriers to Progelcone’s market 
penetration.  
Finally, Progelcone may also face difficulties regarding visibility and because of the 
increasing trend of small store formats in Portugal. As highly advertised manufacturer brands 
and store brands are a big source of profits for retailers, those will continue to be a priority in 
premium shelf allocation and highlight in store. Therefore, if Progelcone aims to compete in a 
market that is highly dependent on financial capacity, it needs to abandon its low cost 
strategy and invest in recognizable differentiation factors. Also, as it is mentioned in the case, 
smaller retail formats are characterized by a small array of products and a high share of store 
brands. Therefore, it will be harder for Snapy to compete with retailers’ brands and with large 




9.What recommendations would you make for the future of Snapy?  
The cookies industry was indeed in the mature stage, with low margins and well 
established products and producers, which created barriers for Snapy to gain market share. 
Although Snapy’s business could probably generate ongoing revenue with little costs, the 
challenges are huge, as seen in the previous questions. However, there still are several 
opportunities for Snapy to grow. The following recommendations aim to contribute to the 
improvement of Snapy’s performance in the current market. 
Since the beginning Progelcone has been focused on the product characteristics, only 
relying on word-of-mouth as a credible way of communication. However, communication 
strategies should be a primary issue when entering such a competitive market. As consumers 
are increasingly bombarded by advertisements and their purchases are strongly influenced by 
promotions or familiar brands it is crucial for the company to invest in differentiation factors 
in order to leave a lasting image on the target group. The power of a brand indeed lies in 
consumers’ minds, and therefore it is truly important to communicate Snapy long-term 
benefits in order to be part of the consumers’ consideration set. As Snapy is a low 
involvement product, Progelcone should leverage its artisanal image to increase involvement 
in the decision making process. By involving consumers’ sense of self during the purchase, 
Progelcone would be able to increase the emotional appeal of the wafer cookies, and thus, 
partly moving it into a hedonic product. As a consequence, consumers’ willingness to pay 
would increase and Snapy would ultimately attract new customers and increase revenues. 
Additionally, Progelcone’s presence in online communication channels was not very 
developed. The use of the Internet is exponentially evolving in Portugal: digital 
communication influences consumers’ decision making process and consumers expect to 
engage with brands through it. Therefore, Progelcone should invest in social networks in 
order to promote Snapy’s brand and establish a close relationship with customers. 
Regarding the threat of store private labels, Progelcone should avoid price reductions 
and be very careful with price promotions, as consumers price sensitiveness increases, and 
thus their willingness to pay decreases. In order to resist private labels competition, 
Progelcone should continue its path of innovation and diversification by investing in a 
broader product line under the Snapy brand. By investing in new flavors and also taking into 
consideration the rise of health categories and easily portable on the go consumption as an 
opportunity, the company would be able to create product extensions and increase its cost 
advantages from the production process. As a result, Progelcone would be able to increase 
Snapy’s brand awareness and more actively compete in this crowded marketplace. 
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Furthermore, in order to avoid the maturity of the market and leverage its brand 
potential, Progelcone could also take advantage from its large portfolio to enter new 
categories. For example, the wafer bowls shown in exhibit 2 could be associated with fun 
occasions and sold as an accompaniment of dessert. Additionally, it could be interesting to 
associate the consumption of the wafer chocolate cups (exhibit 2) with the consumption of 
coffee by making partnerships with brands such as Delta Cafés, Nicola and Nespresso.  
Finally, a possible recommendation would be to explore the Spanish market. 
Progelcone already had a close relationship with Spain and in fact, this European country was 
the second most important market for the company. Exporting Snapy would enable the 
company to take advantage from economies of scale and capture the attention of new 











The development of this Thesis allowed me to acquire a better understanding of the 
Portuguese cookies market and especially of the strategies used by Progelcone to survive and 
enter such a crowded marketplace. 
Even though Progelcone’s core business had continuously been challenged by seasonality 
and excess capacity, it is interesting to understand how the company managed to find a viable 
solution to overcome it. By using its resources and capabilities, Progelcone was able to 
broaden its product scope and explore a new and competitive market. 
In my assessment the company’s lack of knowledge in the field and the lack of 
experience in brand management will mean several problems for the future of Snapy, as 
Portuguese consumers expect cookies to serve more than a hedonic need and keep on 
purchasing on promotions periods. Therefore, this real-life situation will offer several 
opportunities for class discussion. 
During the long path to become the leadering supplier of ice cream products and plastic 
items for the food-service industry, the company faced several changes and challenges. The 
maturity stage of the cookies industry was certainly a big threat, as it contributed to the low 
attractiveness of the market. The decrease of the industry profitability was originated by the 
weak economic situation of Portugal and the price wars initiated by private labels. Moreover, 
as a consequence of the concentration in modern distribution, suppliers faced harsh 
conditions when negotiating with retailers. 
The recommendations proposed in the teaching note address the risks of entering the 
grocery retail and suggest that Progelcone must increase consumers’ involvement in the 
decision making process and invest in brand equity. Morevover, Progelcone should enlarge 
Snapy’s portfolio and pay special attention to digital platforms as a way of communication. 
Furthemore, it is important to mention that the industry data used in this case study was 
extracted from market research companies sample reports. Hence, as predictions and historic 
data are generally used these data may show some deviation from reality. 
Finally, it is crucial for managers to fully understand the internal and external 
environmental factors that may affect its business. However, the unpredictability of those 
variables limit managers ability to determine the best strategy for the company. Therefore, if 
there were no time constraints, it would have been interesting to collect more information 
about the attractiveness of grocery stores and also vending machines, in order to help the 
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decision making process. Those informations would enable the creation of different scenarios 
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